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MUKTIVICĀRA OF BHĀVASENA:
TEXT AND TRANSLATION

Introduction

Of the many doctrinal disputes that separate the two ancient Jaina sects of the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras, two stand out as the most controversial: *Kevalibhukti* and *Strīmukti*. *Kevalibhukti* pertains to the debate over whether a Jaina *arhat*, who has attained omniscience and total freedom from all forms of desire, would still partake of food. The Digambaras maintain that a *Kevalin* will live out the rest of his years without ever consuming food of any sort again, surviving by means of his yogic powers for the full duration of his life. In addition, all normal physical functions such as answering the calls of nature and sleeping would no longer be necessary for such a person. The Śvetāmbaras have taken the opposite view: i.e., that an *arhat*, although entirely free from desire, remains subject to the physical laws governing the body and is not hindered thereby from continuing with the normal life of a mendicant. *Strīmukti*, or the salvation of women, has also engendered diametrically opposed positions on the part of the schools. The Digambaras maintain that *mokṣa* is possible only for males, since they alone can assume the mendicant vow of nudity, a practice which, although not in itself a sufficient cause for *mokṣa*, is nevertheless an essential precondition to any further progress. In their opinion, a nun can continue on the path of *mokṣa* but will have to be reborn

as a male in order to attain final salvation. Like the Digambaras, the Śvetāmbaras also believe that a woman must not assume the vow of nudity; however, they deny that nudity itself is necessary, let alone obligatory, in order to assume the mendicant vows. Wearing clothes, a practice incumbent on Śvetāmbara monks as well, is thus not an impediment to attaining final salvation and does not, as the Digambaras allege, demonstrate the presence of residual sexual desire. They therefore maintain that a Jaina nun is as well-qualified to attain salvation as is a male.

The ninth-century Jaina author Śākaṭyāyana - who belonged to the now-extinct Yāpanīya sect, which favored the Śvetāmbara positions on the above questions - appears to have been the first exegete to write an independent treatise on both of these central controversies. His works, entitled *Kevalibhukti-prakaraṇa* and *Strīnirvāṇa-prakaraṇa*¹, put forth the basic arguments of both schools using appropriate syllogistic formulae as supported by appropriate scriptural testimony. In subsequent centuries, a large body of literature developed in the logical works of both sects concerning these two controversies. I am at present editing a volume which will bring together selections bearing upon the issue of the salvation of women, and have identified more than a dozen texts representing both the Digambara and Śvetāmbara positions. Almost all of these texts had earlier been edited by eminent Jaina scholars, with the exception of one text, the *Bhukti-mukti-vicāra*, by the fourteenth-century Digambara author, Bhāvasena. The date of Bhāvasena, who was distinguished by the title of Traividyaadeva, has been discussed by Dr. V. P. Johrapurkar, who places him in the fourteenth century². Only a single manuscript of this unpublished work has survived, and is part of Professor Ernst Leumann's library, which is now preserved at the Bibliothèque Nationale, Strasbourg. A description of this manuscript appears in Chandrabhal Tripathi, ed., *Catalogue of the Jaina Manuscripts at Strasbourg*³, no. 164. Although it carries only a single title, it consists of two

1. Ed. Jambuvijaya, Bhavanagara, 1974.

2. *Viśvatattvaprakāśa of Bhāvasena*, Sholapur, Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala, 1964, Introduction.

3. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1975.

separate works: *Bhukti-vicāra*, pertaining to the problem of *Kevali-bhukti*, and *Mukti-vicāra*, dealing with the controversy over *Strī-mokṣa*. In the summer of 1980, thanks to a grant from the Social Sciences Research Council, Washington, D. C., I was able to examine the *Bhukti-mukti-vicāra* and obtain a copy of it through the kind permission of the Bibliothèque Nationale.

The text treated in this article is only the *Mukti-vicāra*, which begins on folio 132 and ends at folio 135 of the manuscript. It is thus a short text that, in spite of its erudite demonstration of knowledge concerning logical fallacies, does not add significantly to the arguments given in earlier works by scholars of the two sects. As a matter of fact, our author, Bhāvasena, has devoted only two paragraphs (nos. 23, 24) to a discussion of the central Śvetāmbara and Digambara position: i.e., the former claim that a woman is able to attain *mokṣa* because, like a man, she is free from the conditions that prevent her from attaining perfection in conduct and understanding; and the latter position that, unlike a man, a woman is incapable of attaining « perfection » in any sense, whether it be the extreme demeritoriousness that causes one to fall into the lowest hell, or the extreme purity that results in *mokṣa*. Apparently our author decided not to enlarge on this topic as he himself says that the matter was discussed in full detail by his predecessors, Ācāraya Siddhasena, Dharasena, and Āryanandi in their treatises on this topic. The works he mentions still need to be identified, but there is no doubt that Bhāvasena has drawn heavily upon the *Prameyakamalamārttaṇḍa* by Prabhācandra, which he acknowledges as being his main source in expounding on this controversy.

The importance of Bhāvasena's work, however, lies in a new argument put forth by him: namely, that if Malli, the nineteenth Tirthaṅkara, was a woman, as alleged by the Śvetāmbaras, there would be no reason for the images of that particular Jina to be always depicted as male, as they are even in Śvetāmbara temples. This argument is not found in works earlier than the *Bhukti-mukti-vicāra* and point out a new direction for research on this controversy concerning the salvation of women: i.e., using iconographic evidence to ascertain contemporary forms of worship that will serve to support or disprove rival doctrinal perspectives. The Śve-

tāmbara reply to the position of the *Mukti-vicāra* appears in such later works as Meghavijaya's *Yukti-prabodha*⁴, written in the eighteenth century, but the credit for first raising this controversial topic must go to Bhāvasena's minor work.

BHAVASENAVIRACITO MUKTIVICĀRAH

§ 1 *atha evaitad yathākathanaprathitaprthumatisvayūthyais tathyatayā vacanaṃ kathyate, strīnirvāṇe ko 'yaṃ doṣo viduṣāṃ dūṣaṇāyate, strīpuruṣayoḥ strītvasyaiva mukhyatvāt /*

§ 2 *strīlīṅgādhikaraṇe strītvam ādyam, ādhāryādhārabhūtasya jagato janana-darśanāt / strītvam vinā jagadutpatter abhāvāt / strīyo hy asārasaṃsārasukhakāraṇabhūtaḥ pūtaś cākhilana-rāmara-rājasamājā saha suśobhante Lakṣmī-Sarasvatī-Kīrti-vanitāstrīvena saundaryās toṣyatāṃ gatāḥ, sarvatra strīṇāṃ ādhikyam saṃkhyayā buddhyā ca budhair bambhanyate / strītve hi vaśaṃgato lokaḥ / tasmāt tādr̥gbhūtasya vasudhāpradhānastrīrūpasya nirvāṇaṃ nāstīti vacanaṃ kathaṃ śobheta yato dānapūjādīdharmaṇuṣṭhāne strī janāṃ pravartate / strīnirvāṇaṃ na bhavatīti vadan vidvān vādī svamātur vyāghātakārī babhūva /*

§ 3 *iti cet, na / na tāvaṃ mukhyā mukhyatvam atra ganyam / jñānavairāgyaviśiṣṭadhyānaviśeṣād upalabhyamānamuktipadasyā-dhāryādhārabhāvaḥ strītve na sambhavati / kutaḥ?*

§ 4 *caturbhir mahābhūtaparamāṇubhiḥ kāryakāraṇa-darśanāt strītvam vinā jagadutpatter abhāvo vaktum na yuktaḥ, para-sparaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvābhāvaḥ strītvam vinā prthivyā-dīpadārthapradarśanāt /*

§ 5 *strītve vaśaṃgato loka ity api phalguvalganam / svātmani dattacittavṛttayo mahābhāgā puṇyādhikā maharṣayo vanitāvasuvasundharās tṛṇāya manyante, nispr̥hasya tṛṇaṃ jagad iti nyāyāt / yasmād āsannabhavyatāyāṃ vidyamānāyāṃ tatprabhāveṇa dānapūjādīkarmaṇi pravartanā pratibhāsate / tato na mātur vyāghāla-kāritā /*

4. Ratlam, Rishabhdev Keshrimal, 1928.

§ 6 *kiñca, etāvatā strīkṛtopakārasmaranaparīṇatastrīlolupā-
nām vacanād ābālīśaṃ (?) gatā anvarthasaṃjñāsampannatām gatā /
tatas tāsāṃ muktikathanāṃ bhavatām eva doṣāya, nāsmākaṃ /*

§ 7 *tathā cokaṃ ślokaḥ
karmabhūdravyanārīṇāṃ nādyāṃ saṃhananatrāyaṃ /
vastrādānād acāritraṃ tat tāsāṃ muktikathā vṛthā //
tasmāt strīmuktir na yuktivyuktā tadukter vicārāsahatvāt /*

§ 8 *katham? strītvam hi mahāpāpasya phalam / kutaḥ?
« samyagdarśanaśuddhā nārakatiryaṇnapuṃsakastrītvāni »
iti strītvasya niṣedhāt /*

§ 9 *strīṇāṃ mahāvratārhajātarūpatvābhāvāt / bahulaṃ dī-
kṣāgrahaṇe 'pi strīṇāṃ nirgranthatā tāvat pūrvapuruṣaiḥ [na] śrutā
na cedānīntanair dṛśyate / nirgrantho mokṣamārga iti siddher na
prasiddhir vṛddhasammata / yadi sagrañthena mokṣas tadā sarva-
saṃganirvṛttirūpasya yatidharmasya vaiyarthyaṃ samarthitaṃ
bhavati /*

§ 10 *kiñca, jñānadhyānavairāgyaviśiṣṭanirgranthalakṣaṇopala-
kṣitamumukṣubhiḥ pakṣīkriyamāṇo mokṣaḥ / tallakṣaṇātirikta-
syaiva tasya kathaṃ kāraṇaṃ kathyate? tasmād yauktikajanasyūkyā
strīnirvāṇaṃ sarvātmanā gīrvāṇasaridaparatīraṃ [na] tetīryate /*

§ 11 *napuṃsakasya nirvāṇaṃ nāstīti svayam evābhīdhānāt
tatrāsmākaṃ na prayāsaḥ, ahituṣārīṣiṣyanyāyāt / mahīyasah yo-
gyasya puṃsah sarvato nirvāṇaṃ sukhena jāghaṭyate / tasmāt tas-
minn arthe pramāṇaṃ samarthayāmaḥ /*

§ 12 *na strīsvarūpaṃ sākṣān mokṣabhāg bhavati, nairgran-
thyāyogyarūpatvāt / yad yad nairgranthīyāyogyarūpaṃ tat tat sākṣān
mokṣabhāg na bhavati / yathā napuṃsakasvarūpaṃ / nairgran-
thyāyogyarūpaṃ ca vivādāpannaṃ strīsvarūpaṃ / tāsmān na sākṣān
mokṣabhāg bhavati / nairgranthīyāyogyarūpatvād eva napuṃsakasya
nirvāṇaṃ na bobhavīti yathā tathā strīrūpasyāpi /*

§ 13 *tathā strītvam dharmī mokṣahetur na bhavātīti sādhyo
dharmaḥ, durantaduritodayatvāt / yad durantaduritodayaṃ tat tat
muktihetur na bhavati / durantaduritodayaṃ ca vivādāpannaṃ
strītvam, tasmān muktihetur na bhavati /*

§ 14 *tathā mokṣo dharmī strīve na sambhavati, prakṛṣṭadu-
ṣṭāṣṭakarmakṣayarūpatvāt / yo yaḥ prakṛṣṭaduṣṭāṣṭakarmakṣaya-
rūpaḥ sa sarvo 'pi strīve na sambhavati, yathā prasiddhasiddha-
svarūpam / prakṛṣṭaduṣṭāṣṭakarmakṣayarūpaś cāyaṁ mokṣaḥ /
tasmāt strīve na sambhavati /*

§ 15 *tathāpagatākhladoṣaduhkhapakṣo mokṣaḥ strīve na
prāpnoti, pranaṣṭaduṣṭāṣṭakarmarūpatvāt / vyatireke strīvedoda-
yavat / ity anvayavyatirekābhyām upalabhya nirvāṇasvarūpaṁ
strīve na sambhavatīti syādvādaavidyāvinodibhir niścīyate / sarva-
tra syādvādaavidyāvikramaḥ samkrāmati, ākramati ca parākramaṁ
pareṣāṁ viduṣāṁ /*

§ 16 *vivādāpannā strī nirvāṇaṁ na labhate, strīvedodayatvāt /
yathedānīntaṁ kācit kāntā / tasmāt tathā / strīvedodayatvād ity
asya hetoḥ pakṣe sabbhāvān na svarūpāsiddhatvam / na vyadhika-
raṇāsiddhatvam ca, ubhayavādibhiḥ hetor niścītatvāt / nāññātā-
siddhatvam na samdigdhāsiddhatvaṁ ca / sādhyaviparīte niścītāvi-
nābhāvābhāvān na viruddhatvam / vipakṣe vṛttirahitatvāt nā nai-
kāntikatvam / prativādyasiddhasādhyasādhanatvān nākiñcitkara-
tvam / sapakṣasattvaniścayān nānadhyavasītatvam / pakṣe sādhyā-
bhāvāvedakapratyakṣānumānāgamalokasvavacanānām abhāvān na
kālatyayāpadīṣṭatvam / parapakṣe 'strīrūpatvān na prakaraṇasa-
matvam [iti] hetuḍoṣābhāvo vibhāvīyate bhāvaiḥ vidvajjanaiḥ /*

§ 17 *kācit kāntā nirvāṇaṁ na prāpnotīti sādhyasya sabbhāvān
na sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ / strīvedodayatvād iti sādhanasya sad-
bhāvān na sādhanavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ / ubhayasadbhāvān nobhaya-
vikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ / idānīntanakāntādṛṣṭāntāvaṣṭambhenokto nāśra-
yahīno dṛṣṭāntaḥ / vyāptidarśanapūrvakatvāt nāpradarśitavyāpti-
kaḥ / anvayadrṣṭānte sādhanasadbhāvapradarśanena sādhyasadbhā-
vasya darśītatvāt na viparītavāptiko 'pi / iti nirdiṣṭānumānāt śiṣṭā-
nuśiṣṭāviśiṣṭānāṁ dṛṣṭeṣṭasiddhir bhavaty eva /*

§ 18 *nanv etāvatā katham iṣṭasiddhir buddhimatāṁ hetor
anaikāntikadoṣaduṣṭatvāt? bhagavati Mallibhaṭṭārake strīvedoda-
yatvād iti sādhanasya sabbhāve nirvāṇaṁ na prāpnotīti sādhyā-
bhāvāt, tena hetor vyabhicāras sutarāṁ sañcarati /*

§ 19 *maivam kathayantu bhavantaḥ / tat katham iti cet / tasya bhagavataḥ parameśvarasya puṁstvasādhakapratyakṣānumā-nāgamapramāṇānāṁ bahūnāṁ bahuśo darśanāt /*

§ 20 *tathā hi loke na kvāpi pratyakṣeṇa bhagavatpratīkṛtau strītvam daiṛḍṣyāmahe, puruṣākāratvenopalabhyamānatvāt / ta-tathā'numānapramāṇaprayogo 'pi yuktiparipāṭikoṭim āṭīkate / vivā-dādhyāsito bhagavān puṁnān eva bhavati, pratīkṛtau strītvenādṛṣya-mānatvāt / yathā ubhayoḥ siddhānte prasiddho Vardhamānasvā-mī, tathā cāyaṁ tatas tathā /*

§ 21 *punaś ca / vivādāpannaḥ strī na bhavati, jinapratibimbe strīrūpeṇāvidyamānatvāt, strīlīngatvenānupapannatvāt, puruṣatve-nopapannatvāt, tadvad ity ādibhir bahubhir hetubhis tasya puruṣa-tvasamarthanena na vyabhicāraḥ sañcaraty asmākinahetoḥ /*

§ 22 « *puṁvedaṁ vedaṁtā* » ityādy āgamo 'pi yuktighaṭām āṭāṭyate (?) / *tathā ca stotraṁ*
« *yasya maharṣeḥ sakalapadārthāḥ, pratyavabodhāt samajani sākṣāt* » / [iti] *pūrvācāryastutirūpatvaṁ pullīngatvam eva sādha-yati, strīrūpajinastuter adarśanāt / strītvajinastavanasyāvidyamā-natvāt / loke na ke 'pi strīrūpajinābhāsam arcayanti /*

§ 23 *athāsti strīnāṁ mokṣaḥ, avikalakāraṇatvāt, prasiddha-puruṣavat /*

§ 24 *maivam / mokṣahetuḥjñānādiparamaprakarṣaḥ strīṣu nā-sti, paramaprakarṣatvāt / saptamaprthvīgamanakāraṇā puṇyapara-maprakarṣavat / tathā, yo mokṣahetuḥ saṁyamo dharmī strīṣu nastīti sādhyo dharmāḥ / sādhūnām eva vidyamānatvāt / vyatireke grhasthavat / nāsti strīnāṁ mokṣaḥ, bāhyābhyantaraparigraha-tvāt / grhasthavat /*

§ 25 *tasmāt bhagavatparameśvarasya strītvapratipādakaṁ Śve-tāmbarādivākyam vandhyāstanandhayadhanurvidyāvaiśāradyavad idānīm ḥṛdyatām gatam, saṁkṣepeṇa bhuktimuktiyuktisūktyā vicā-ritā, tathā pramāṇaprameyaprasiddhaSiddhasenācāryeṇa Bhukti-muktiprajñaptigranthe grathitvā nirūpitā, tathā syādvādaavidyādha-raDharasenamuninā Bhuktivivarāṇe praṇītā, tathā Āryanandimunīn-dreṇa Bhuktimuktikathāyām grathitvā kathitā vistarataḥ, Prame-*

yakamalamārttaṇḍe *pracāṇḍaPrabhācandrapaṇḍitadevair nānāpra-*
māṇaiḥ prapañcitā, bhuktimuktiyuktijñair veditavyeti siddham naḥ
samāhitam //

Translation

§ 1 There are those people (namely, the Śvetāmbaras) whose faculties have been dulled by virtue of hearing the words handed down in the tradition. They accept the words of the leader of their own « herd » and (boastfully) state the following: What kind of fault is it that attaches to the intelligent in accepting (the claim) that women attain *mokṣa*, since, between men and women, it is the female who is more prominent?

§ 2 In all matters pertaining to the feminine gender, the human female occupies the foremost position. This is because it is the female who is seen to be the begetter of the world, which is both the support (the earth) and the supported (living beings). Indeed without women, the very origin of the world would not take place.

Moreover, women are also the source of happiness in this joyless (*asāra*) world of transmigration. Women are also pure of heart, and they bring glory to men, gods, and royalty by virtue of being the embodiments of the Goddess of Wealth (Lakṣmī), the Goddess of Learning (Sarasvatī), and the Goddess of Fame (Kīrti). They also become praiseworthy because of their beauty. Thus, because of their number (i.e., population) and their intelligence, in all ways the superiority of women has been accepted by the wise.

Indeed, the whole world has come under the sway of women. Therefore, is it really proper to say that there is no *mokṣa* for women who are of such eminence and who are foremost on earth? Surely, why otherwise would the woman participate in the practice of the *dharma* through charity, worship, etc. (if she were not certain of attaining *mokṣa* thereby)? Surely, the learned opponent who maintains that women cannot attain *mokṣa* has set up an obstruction to his own mother's (salvation).

§ 3 We deny this claim. Here, (in the matter of *mokṣa*), the relative superiority or inferiority (of men or women) is not what should be considered. We maintain instead that a female body does not provide the kind of support that is required for the attainment of *mokṣa*, (since *mokṣa*) is obtainable only by an extraordinary kind of trance that is distinguished by (perfect) knowledge and detachment. How so?

§ 4 Since one can perceive the cause-and-effect relationship produced by the atoms of the four great material elements, it is therefore not proper to maintain that there would be no production in the world without a feminine principle. Neither is there any mutual cause/effect relationship between femininity and the world, since such elements as earth, etc. are seen (to be produced without the presence of a feminine principle).

§ 5 Equally futile is your statement that the world has come under the sway of womanhood. The great souls who have directed their mental activities toward their own selves, as well as the noble sages who have accumulated great merit, all consider women, wealth, and earth to be (as insignificant as) a blade of grass. As the gnome (rule) says, « For a man without desire, the whole world is like a blade of grass ». Neither is there any setting up of an obstacle to the salvation of mothers, since when the conditions conducive to the attainment of *mokṣa* are present, the force of that (totality of cause) will create in women a natural turning toward such activities as charity and worship.

§ 6 Moreover, those (who maintain that women attain *mokṣa*), say so because of their attachment to women, which is engendered by their memory of the many good deeds done for them by women (such as giving birth and rearing them). Therefore, it is appropriate that you have come to receive the designation « childish ».

§ 7 For it has been said in the following verse:

Those who are physically women in the realm of action are not endowed with the first three kinds of configurations of joints in the body. (In the absence of these first three

configurations), they must accept clothes and, hence, are not fit to assume (the highest) conduct⁵.

Therefore, the doctrine of the salvation of women is not reasonable, nor does it stand up to scrutiny.

§ 8. How so? Femininity is the result of great sinfulness. On what grounds? Because femininity is rejected (by those with right vision) as in the following phrase: « Beings who are pure on account of right insight (are not reborn as) hell-beings, animals, hermaphrodites, or females »⁶.

§ 9 (Femininity is also the result of great sinfulness) because women are unable to practice nudity, which is the prerequisite for assuming the great mendicant vows.

Moreover, even though women are ordained as nuns, no one in the past has ever admitted (lit., heard) that they attain freedom from all possessions (*nirgranthatā*), nor is this seen at present by any of us. It is admitted by all that the path of *mokṣa* involves the total freedom from all possessions. Therefore, your claim (that women may attain *mokṣa*) is not accepted by the elders (of the tradition). If *mokṣa* could indeed be attained while retaining possessions, then this would amount to supporting the futility of the mendicant discipline, which consists of forsaking all attachments.

§ 10 Moreover, *mokṣa* is that which is adhered to by those aspirants who are characterized by nonpossession and distinguished

5. The use of the word *karmabhū* (« realm of action ») is meant to exclude the realm of enjoyment (*bhogabhūmi*), from whence *mokṣa* cannot be achieved. The word *dravyanārī* (« physically women ») excludes from consideration people who are physically male but may entertain female libido and thus metaphorically be called female. The word *saṃghanana* (« configurations of joints ») refers to different types of joints. Jains believe that there are six grades of such joints, from the perfect joint, noted for its adamant quality, to the weakest joint. It is further believed that the highest trances can be entered into only by those who are endowed with one of the first three grades of joints. For details, see JINENDRA VARNĪ, *Jainendrasiddhāntakośa*, IV, New Delhi, Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha, 1973, p. 156.

6. *samyagdarsānaśuddhā nārakatiryaṇnapuṃsakastrītvāni /
duṣkṛtavikṛtālpāyur darīdratāṃ ca vrajanti nāpy avratikāḥ //*

Ratnakaraṇḍa-śrāvaka-cāra of Samantabhadra, Māṇikacandra Digamabara Jaina Granthamālā, No. 24 Bombay, 1926, verse 35.

by (their perfection of) knowledge, meditation, and dispassion. How could you claim that keeping (possessions, such as the nuns' wearing of clothes), which is devoid of the characteristics of *mokṣa*, could act as the very cause of *mokṣa*? Therefore the doctrine that women may attain *mokṣa* must be considered entirely incapable of reaching the other shore of the river of the valid arguments put forth by the logicians.

§ 11 There is no need for us to strive to prove that hermaphrodites (congenitally) may not attain *mokṣa*, since our opponent has also accepted it. This (statement is made) according to the accepted law that when an eagle is present, a teacher does not need a disciple to get rid of a snake⁷. It can be proved with great ease in all cases that a man who is a great yogin may attain *mokṣa*. Therefore we will put forth valid arguments to prove that he (alone) attains *mokṣa*.

§ 12 (Proposition): A being in a woman's body cannot attain *mokṣa* in that very life.

(Reason): Because it is a body which is unsuitable for the relinquishment of all possessions (i.e., holy nudity is not allowed).

(Invariable concomitance): Whatever body is unsuitable for attaining the state of holy nudity (*nairgranthya*) is unable to attain *mokṣa* in that very life.

(Example): As is the case with the body of a hermaphrodite.

(Application): The body of a woman, which is under debate here, is similarly unsuitable for holy nudity.

(Conclusion): Therefore, a being in a female body cannot attain *mokṣa*. Just as *mokṣa* is not admitted for a hermaphrodite because of its unsuitability for holy nudity, so it is also for a woman's body.

7. The rule given here is rather obscure. The purport seems to be that when an eagle is present, a teacher does not need to have anyone else, like a disciple, to remove a snake, as eagles are said to be invincible in capturing snakes. Since both the *śvetāmbaras* and *Digambaras* agree that hermaphrodites may not attain *mokṣa*, the *Digambara* is under no obligation to provide new arguments to prove that point. It should be recalled here that the *Digambaras* use hermaphrodites as an example of a category of human beings who cannot attain *mokṣa*, and they seek to show that, unlike men, women belong to the same category.

§ 13 (Proposition): Similarly, womanhood is the locus. It is not the cause of *mokṣa* - this is the proposition to be proved.

(Reason): This is because exceedingly miserable karmic results occur in her.

(Invariable concomitance): Whatever is (the result of) exceedingly miserable karmic actions cannot become a cause for *mokṣa* (as is the case for hell-beings or animals).

(Application): Womanhood, which is under debate here, is the result of the origination of the most miserable *karmas*.

(Conclusion): Therefore, womanhood is not a cause for *mokṣa*.

§ 14 Similarly, *mokṣa* is the locus; and it is incompatible with womanhood because of the nature of *mokṣa*, which involves the total destruction of the eight kinds of extremely evil *karmas*. Whatever has the nature of bringing about the destruction of these eight kinds of *karmas*⁸ - as has, for example, the liberated soul, about which there is no dispute - cannot possibly occur in women. The *mokṣa* we talk of is precisely of that nature and, therefore, cannot possibly occur in women.

§ 15 Similarly, *mokṣa* has the nature of being totally free from all passions and suffering. It is impossible in woman, because that *mokṣa* has the nature of bringing about the total elimination of the eight kinds of evil *karmas*. The contrary example is the rise of the female libido in a woman, (which proves that she is not free from passions and suffering and the *karmas* that cause those). In this manner, by both supporting and contrary examples, it is determined by those who are trained in the application of the Jaina doctrine of conditional statements (*syādvāda*) that the nature of *mokṣa* is incompatible with womanhood. In all cases, the application of the tropology prevails, and it also overcomes the arguments of the learned opponents.

§ 16 The woman under dispute (i.e., the Jaina nun) does not attain *nirvāṇa*, because the female libido arises in her, as in any other woman. (The nun) is like (any other woman). The reasoning

8. For these eight kinds of *karmas* see P. S. JAINI, *The Jaina Path of Purification*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California, 1979, Chapter 4, pp. 107-133.

given by us (for not allowing her to attain *mokṣa*) - namely, the occurrence of the female libido (in her) - is valid, because (none of the following ten reasons by which a *hetu* can be proved invalid apply).

1. The reasoning given is not vitiated by the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddhatva*, because of the reasoning - namely, that the rise of the female libido is present in the locus of a woman's body.
2. The reasoning given is not vitiated by the fallacy of *vyadhikaraṇāsiddhatva*, because both parties to the dispute accept the fact that the female libido does exist in a woman's body.
3. It is not vitiated by either the fallacy of *ajñātāsiddhatva*, or 4. the fallacy of *saṃdigdhāsiddhatva*, since the opponent is neither ignorant about the presence of the female libido in a woman's body, nor does he entertain any doubts about that.
5. There is no fallacy of *viruddhatva*, because of the reasoning given by us - namely, that the rise of the female libido in a woman is not found elsewhere (with unfailing invariable concomitance).
6. There is no fallacy of *anaikāntikatva*, since the rise of the (female libido) cannot be proved to exist in either its locus or non-locus.
7. There is no fallacy of *akiñcitkaratva*, because it does not prove the opposite - namely, the salvation of women, which has not yet been established by the opponent.
8. There is no fallacy of *anadhyavasitatva*, because the reasoning (of the libido arising) is also found in similar cases (i.e., in other women).
9. There is no fallacy of *kālātyayāpadiṣṭatva*, because of the absence of any perception, inference, scriptural authority, or wordly convention by which one could assert the absence of that reason (the rise of the libido) in the locus (the nun).

10. There is no fallacy of *prakaraṇasamatva*, since there is no matching argument put forth by the opponent which would support his claim more than ours.

Thus, the learned have shown that our reason is free from all the fallacies (of logic).

§ 17 Our example is free from the fault of *sādhyaṅvikala*, since there exists the locus of that which is to be proved, i.e., that no woman attains *mokṣa*.

Our example is free from the fault of *sādhanavikala*, because of the presence of the reason given by us.

Our example is free from the fault of *ubhayavikala*, because the example is applicable both to the nun as well as to the reason given.

Our example is free from the fault of *āśrayahīna*, since our example is valid for any woman at this present time.

Our example is free from the fault of *apradarśitavyāptika*, since the invariable concomitance between the reason and both the locus and the example has been demonstrated.

Our example is also free from the fault of *viparītavyāptika*, because we have demonstrated that *mokṣa* is not possible when there is the rise of the female libido.

Thus, by the aforementioned inferences, for those distinguished people who have been taught by the noble teachers, there would be the establishment of the desired object which is perceived by us to be true.

§ 18 Objection: But surely, how could you say that, for intelligent people, this is established as you want it to be?, since the reason given by you is vitiated by the fault of *anaikāntika* (a fault arising by virtue of the reason not being universally applicable). Your thesis that *mokṣa* is not possible for women because of the rise of the female libido is not applicable in the case of the Lady Malli (who was a female Tīrthaṅkara). The exception of Malli proves that your argument is fallacious⁹.

9. The Jainas believe that, in each time-cycle, twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras appear in the world. According to the Digambaras, all of these are male. In the Śvetāmbara canon (e.g., *Nāyādhammakahāo*, viii), however, one of the

§ 19 You should not say this. This is because, we perceive many means of verification, such as perception, inference, and scriptural testimony which prove the masculinity of the exalted Lords, the Tirthaṅkaras.

§ 20 For example, no one in the world has ever perceived the (alleged) femininity of the images of the Lord Malli; on the contrary, those images are always depicted in masculine gender. Similarly, the syllogistic application of the inference also shows that it has reached the perfection of reasoning (?). The Lord under debate must be a man, because he is never portrayed as female in his images. This is like the images of Vardhamāna (Mahāvīra), which are well known to be male in the traditions of both parties. The same is the case here (with Malli), so it must be like that (i.e., since her image is male, Malli must actually have been male).

§ 21 Moreover, the person under debate (Malli) cannot be a woman, because that Lord is not to be found in female form in the images of the Jinas. This is because the images of that particular Lord are not found to be endowed with feminine characteristics, but only with male qualities, etc. This and many other reasons support (our claim) that the Lord was male, and no reasons (of the opponent) vitiate the reasoning which we have put forth.

§ 22 As far as scriptural testimony is concerned, the following statement, « experiencing the male libido, etc. » also supports the same argument¹⁰.

Tirthaṅkaras of the current cycle was female, namely Malli. The images of Malli even in Śvetāmbara temples are, however, conventionally depicted as male. It may be noted in this connection that a stone-image of a Jaina female mendicant seated in cross-legged posture was found recently in north India and is now in the Lucknow Museum. A plate of this image was reproduced in my *Jaina Path of Purification*, where scholarly speculation that it might have been a Śvetāmbara image of the Tirthaṅkara Malli was discussed. Unfortunately, the image is decapitated, which compounds the difficulty of identifying the figure. Since the publication of my book, it has been brought to my attention that long, braided hair is found represented on the backside of the image, a feature quite inconsistent with the appearance of a female mendicant. Thus, the possibility of this image being that of Malli is no longer tenable.

10. The complete verse reads as follows:

*puṇṇvedaṃ vedaṃtā je purisā khavagaseḍhimārūḍhā /
sesodayeṇa vi tahā jhāṇuvajuttā ya te du sijjhanti //*

Moreover, there is also this panegyric (in praise of the Lord Malli): « That great sage (Maharṣi), in whose omniscience appeared the direct cognition of all existing knowables »¹¹. Thus, the panegyric uttered by the ancient teachers supports only the masculinity of the Lord Malli (for the word *maharṣi* in the above verse is in the masculine gender); nowhere is there found any praise of a Jina's femininity. There also does not exist any panegyric which praises the Jina as possessing a female form, nor does anyone in the world worship the image of a Jina in a female form.

§ 23 But surely women may attain *mokṣa*, because the conditions required for *mokṣa* are not absent in them, as is also the case with men (who are accepted by both sects as being able to attain *mokṣa*)¹².

§ 24 Do not say this! The condition for *mokṣa* is the extreme perfection of knowledge, etc. That perfection is not found in women, because it is a perfection (that a woman can never achieve), as is the case with her not being able to attain the extreme form of demerit which alone can lead to seventh (and lowest) hell. Thus, the cause of salvation, which is perfect conduct, is not found in the locus, namely women, but only in the male mendicants. The contrary example is that of the householders. (Thus we may conclude that) women do not attain *mokṣa*, because they have the internal (passions) and external (clothes, etc.), just as do householders.

Prakrit Siddha-bhakti, verse 6; quoted in *Prameyakamalamārttaṇḍa* of Prabhācandra, ed. Mahendra Kumar Shastri, Bombay, 1941, p. 333. The Digambaras quote this verse in support of their sectarian claim that only a person who has a male body (*puruṣa*) may attain *mokṣa* even if he should entertain a female libido (*stri-veda*); the verse is also used to prove that a woman may not attain the same goal even if she should entertain male libido (*puṣṭi-veda*).

11. This verse is from the *Svayambhū-stotra* (verse 106), by the Digambara mendicant-poet Samantabhadra. See *Nityanaimittikapāṭhāvali*, Karanja, 1956, pp. 29-44.

12. This is the central point of the argument used by all Svetāmbara scholars in defense of their position. Our author's reply, given in the following paragraph (§ 24), that women are incapable of attaining perfection in conduct or knowledge, also sums up the Digambara position on this controversy.

§ 25 Thus, the words of the Svetāmbaras purporting to show the femininity of the Lord, the Tirthaṅkara Malli, are as enchanting as the expertise in archery of the son of a barren woman. This we have examined in brief in this work, which has given arguments against the *mokṣa* of women and the eating of food (*bhukti*) by the Kevalin. Similarly, the Ācārya Siddhasena, who is well known for his treatment of the objects and theories of knowledge, has explained this matter properly in the work called *Bhuktimuktiprajñapti*¹³. It has also been set forth by the sage Dharasena, the great master of Syādvāda, in his work, *Bhuktivivaraṇa*¹⁴. So also has it been discussed in great detail by the great sage, Āryanandi, in his compilation, *Bhuktimuktikathā*¹⁵. Finally, the great learned one, Prabhācandra, who is the wisest of the learned, has examined this issue in great detail with many means of verification, in his work, *Prameyakamalamārttaṇḍa*¹⁶. These arguments should all be known from these sources by those who wish to know the arguments refuting the *mokṣa* of women, as well as the eating of food by the Kevalin. Thus is established our objective (in this work).

13. Nothing is known about this work, and it is not included in the extant works of Siddhasena (also known as Siddhasena Divākara). See *Siddhasena Divākara's Sanmati-tarka*, edited by Sukhalal Sanghavi and Bechardas Doshi, Bombay, Jain Shvetambar Education Board, 1939.

14. Dharasena is probably identical to the Digambara ācārya Dharasena, the author of the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama-sūtra* (edited with its commentary *Dhavalā* by Hiralal Jain, Amaravati, Jaina Sāhityoddhāraka Fund, 1939-59). The *Bhuktivivaraṇa* is probably the name given by Bhāvasena to those *sūtras* which deal with the *guṇasthānas* attained by a woman, e.g. *Dhavalā*, I, p. 348, *sūtras* 107-108.

15. Nothing more is known at present about this work attributed to Āryanandi.

16. For the *Premeyakamalamārttaṇḍa*, see *supra*, note 7.